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Autonomous Cars and the Anonymous
Threat: The Immediate Need for
Cybersecurity Legislation for Self-Driving
Vehicles
Forrest Albiston1

F

irst, Andy’s car fan turned on without him touching it. Soon,
Andy lost control of the music, the wipers turned on with
the windshield wiper fluid spraying, and the engine shut
off. In the middle of the freeway, Andy Greenberg’s 2014 Jeep
Cherokee had been hacked. Eventually, Andy regained control
of his vehicle and quickly pulled over, shouting expletives.
Fortunately for Andy, this was a journalistic experiment. The men
hacking into the vehicle’s systems were not actually making an
attempt on his life.2 But not all hackers have such good intentions.
The Jeep Cherokee, like many vehicles, was accessible to
remote hackers because of new and innovative technologies used
by many car companies, such as Chrysler’s Uconnect system.3
Some cars come with special cruise control features that help
the car stay inside lanes autonomously.4 For example, Tesla
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has been testing an autopilot feature for its vehicles. Uber and
Google are testing and supporting self-driving cars.5 Companies
are integrating more technology into cars today than ever before.
Despite technology’s benefits, there are always pitfalls.
For example, drones have changed the way wars are fought and
scientific research is conducted. While drones can be very useful,
they have also caused problems for airports and for firefighters
combatting forest fires. Drone regulation had to catch up with
technology instead of being ahead of it and as a result, the rising
industry has had many setbacks. This is the same problem
that self-driving cars face: lack of preemptive legislation.
As cars become smarter, there is a need for legislation
to ensure the safety and privacy of the American people. We
can better understand the threats to vehicle cybersecurity
by reviewing past and upcoming legislation, gaining
a better understanding of cybersecurity and vehicles,
considering possible attackers, and looking at cybersecurity
assessments. These insights show the immediate need to fill
the legislative hole regarding smart and self-driving vehicles.
Though legislation on the cybersecurity of automated
vehicles is largely unprecedented, the advent of smarter
and self-driving cars requires the federal legislature to take
greater action. To protect consumers from quickly rising
cybersecurity threats, the SPY Car Act of 2017 should be
immediately enacted with a few changes to its wording
and with added definitions to cybersecurity measures. 6
Part I of this paper will provide background information
on the development of the SPY Car Act. Part II will review
past legislation on automated vehicles, including acts that are
pending before Congress. Part III will consider legislation on
drones, a similar technology to smart and self-driving vehicles,
5
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as well as the overall status of automated vehicle cybersecurity.
Part IV will discuss cybersecurity threats and the difficulties of
assessing cybersecurity. Part V will provide an overview of the
current cybersecurity status of automated vehicles, while Part
VI will give an overview of the SPY Car Act of 2017, and Part
VII will recommend alterations to the act. Finally, Part VIII will
review the positive and negative aspects of the act and Part
IX will review recommended changes to the SPY Car Act as
well as the consequences of and immediate need for the act.
I. Background

Many parts of the infrastructure of modern cars are
vulnerable to attacks. Electronic engine transmission systems,
Bluetooth devices, airbags, keyless entry, and even the driver’s
phone are just a few of the systems that can be used as entry
points for a cyber-attack.7 As technology advances, cars have
more and more electronic parts, including tire air pressure
sensors. These pieces are vulnerable and require cybersecurity.8
Cybersecurity has many components. According to
the National Institute of Standards and Technology, those
components include identification, protection, detection,
response, and recovery.9 Identification of threats helps companies
manage and prioritize cybersecurity risks.10 The protection of
entry points requires the development of safeguards to defend
the infrastructure of a system.11 Detection involves identifying
7
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a cybersecurity threat as it is occurring. Then, the response
component is to act against the detected threat.12 Finally, recovery
involves repairing any damaged systems from the threat and
ensuring that it doesn’t happen again.13 These steps are the basics
to ensure that companies and people stay secure. The SPY CAR Act,
currently under review in the Senate, focuses on implementing
these steps as cybersecurity standards for modern vehicles.14
In 2013, Senator Ed Markey of Massachusetts learned
about the increasing need for vehicle cybersecurity. Senator
Markey then began writing to car manufacturers to discuss
what was being done to implement cybersecurity in their
vehicles. In July 2015, Charlie Miller and Chris Valasek—
two hackers who research carjacking—worked with WIRED
magazine to show the vulnerability of Chrysler vehicles
to remote hacking.15 That same month, Senator Markey
introduced the SPY Car Act of 2015.16 Miller and Valasek later
published more about the vulnerability of Chrysler vehicles.17
During this time, the SPY Car Act was revised and, in 2017, it
was reintroduced in the Senate as the SPY Car Act of 2017.18
The SPY Car Act is not the only self-driving car act to
be introduced. The SELF DRIVE Act was introduced in 2017 as
well.19 This act focuses more on informing consumers of the
12
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ability of automated vehicles and very little on cybersecurity.
There are also other state laws regarding self-driving cars,
but those laws regulate the rules of testing these vehicles on
the road and keeping people safe during tests. Arizona has an
executive order that states necessary precautions should be
taken when testing self-driving vehicles.20 California has the
most laws governing self-driving vehicles, including regulations
like permits to test vehicles and reporting accidents within ten
days.21 Those regulations do not go into cybersecurity, as they
are not designed to govern the purchase of such vehicles, just
testing them. For this reason, this review will focus mainly on the
SPY Car Act, while also briefly discussing similar technologies
and the SELF DRIVE Act to highlight areas of improvement.
II. Similar Legislation

The SELF DRIVE Act22 is another act of Congress
that has yet to pass. The act focuses on ensuring the safety of
those using self-driving vehicles and takes into consideration
cybersecurity. It is not, however, very descriptive when it
comes to stating what automakers’ responsibilities would be.
The act requires automakers to have a written cybersecurity
plan that includes preventing foreseeable intrusions, limiting
access to driving systems, and making sure there is a director
of cybersecurity in the company.23 While these are prudent
regulations, they make up only a small section of the act.
This small section cannot possibly cover the expanse
of cybersecurity threats in modern vehicles. Much more
20
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is needed to protect against threats than to state that
unauthorized intrusions should be identified, assessed, and
mitigated. Such a statement is obvious and provides no real
standard for these vehicles. Most automakers already meet
these minimum requirements; the purpose of adding the
requirements to the SELF DRIVE Act is to ensure a standard of
safety to protect not only the consumer, but automakers as well.
Another problem with the SELF DRIVE Act is that it is
designed for highly automated vehicles. Because that phrase—
“highly automated vehicles”—is largely subject to interpretation,
it could be assumed that Andy Greenberg’s Jeep did not fall
under the highly automated vehicle category. That car only had
limited computer capabilities, but it was still hacked into and had
its engine shut down. This illustrates how the SELF DRIVE Act is
insufficient for the cybersecurity needs of the American people.
The final problem with the SELF DRIVE Act is that it allows
automakers to make their own regulations. The Act states that a
manufacturer cannot sell an automated or partially automated
car “unless such manufacturer has developed a cybersecurity
plan that includes . . . a written cybersecurity policy.”24 Some
automakers will likely do the bare minimum for the cybersecurity
of their vehicles, then point to the law if their cybersecurity
protections are challenged. While the law should protect
automakers, not just consumers, there should be a higher standard
set so all automakers provide more comprehensive protection.
Other legislative efforts on self-driving cars focus
on testing regulations. These laws are not significant when
considering the cybersecurity needs of self-driving cars.
States like California and Arizona have approved testing on
their roads and have terms and conditions as stated above.
III. Parallel Technologies

24
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problems that are a public safety concern. Drones are a prime
example of a technology that is not yet regulated well.25 Lack of
regulation resulted in consumers flying drones into buildings and
getting drones in the way of helicopters and other manned aircraft.26
While a few general guidelines are in place, they are not extensive,
and the FAA is overwhelmed and far behind on legislation.27
Yet, there are some regulations. In 2007, for example,
commercial use of drones was banned in certain areas where
a federal appeal was needed to use drones commercially.28
Journalists were also banned from using drones.29 These blanket
ban regulations, passed because progressive legislation is
lacking, have hurt the journalism industry and its technological
progression. While regulation is needed, just banning something
will not resolve the problem. This type of regulation pushes
the problem to a future date to be solved. In 2013, Amazon
announced plans for drone delivery.30 This has still not been
implemented, and the United States is falling behind other
countries on these types of advancements due to lack of regulation.
It is important to have regulations and to not fall
behind these new technologies so that years later commercial
industries are not struggling to advance. It is also important
to have these regulations to protect people from the dangers
that can come from new technology. In the case of drones,
those dangers include people getting hurt or getting in the
way of other flying vehicles. Like drones, self-driving cars are
25
26
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still a new technology, and regulations can still be made that
will still allow the industry to not fall behind, but advance
and keep people safe. Regulations in cybersecurity are an
important step in achieving safety for self-driving cars.
IV. Current Threats

An important part of understanding the cybersecurity
threat to vehicles is understanding where it came from. There
are different types of people who would like to hack into a
vehicle. Understanding who they are, the threats they pose,
and their motives is important context to protecting vehicles.31
The first and most dangerous threat comes from other
nations. There are many reasons another nation would want
to hack into the cars of US citizens: spying, tracking, gathering
data about driver habits, causing harm to drivers, disrupting
transportation grids, economic chaos, etc. Cyberwarfare can be
waged and people can be killed by hackers shutting off braking
systems, driving into other cars, etc. There are many ways that
other countries can use a cybersecurity breach in a vehicle.32
Organized crime groups also pose a threat to vehicle
cybersecurity. Whether it be terrorists, gangs, or the mafia, these
groups can cause harm to drivers. This category has the broadest
spectrum of reasons for committing crimes, and they are a
significant threat to the American public. Spying, killing, and
threatening are all crimes that organized groups could commit.
While they lack the same resources that a nation-state usually does,
they are not to be disregarded.33 Cars have been used in several
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terrorist attacks, most recently in New York City.34 If terrorists
could control the car without being inside, or turn someone else’s
car into a weapon, it would be a manageable attack on a country.35
The third group, pranksters and hacktivists, pose a
much smaller threat. Pranksters pose a small threat, as many
pranks are harmless. However, their pranks sometimes go
awry and people do get hurt and even die. Hacktivists are often
part of a larger community that tries to keep an open forum on
hacks. That forum helps build up defense and show automotive
companies what their cars’ cybersecurity weaknesses
are.36 In 2016, President Obama put out an executive order
encouraging private companies to have open forums to help
speed along the development of diagnosing cybersecurity risks
and protections.37 This can still be a threat when pranksters,
organized crime, and terrorists obtain the data and use it
before the appropriate changes are made to defend against it.38
The final group is the owners of the vehicles themselves.
Vehicle owners have various reasons for hacking their own
vehicles, including cheating emissions tests and overriding
governors (devices used to regulate speed) to get the most out of
their vehicle. These owners are usually trying to make their cars
go faster, handle better, etc.39 This overriding can be dangerous
as owners may not know exactly what they are doing or what
the consequences of removing certain electronic barriers are. It
can also make their vehicles more susceptible to cyberattacks
34
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and therefore more dangerous when they are on the road.40
V. Cybersecurity Today

To draw attention to the imminent threat that hacking
poses, WIRED journalist Andy Greenberg planned to be hacked
by two hacking researchers as part of an investigative journalism
article.41 This hacking demonstration showed that the 2014 Jeep
Cherokee and many other Chrysler vehicles were vulnerable, and
forced a massive Chrysler recall42 so the automaker could patch
the system and make it safer. These same hackers also inspired
Senator Markey,43 who began conducting cybersecurity research.
In 2014, Senator Markey began conducting this research
on the current cybersecurity status of vehicles.44 He found that
almost all vehicles with some sort of wireless technology were
vulnerable, most automakers were unaware of security risks
to their vehicles, and only two automakers could describe
how they respond to risks in real time. He discovered that
most of the measures used to prevent hacking could not do
so in real time and were not designed to—a cause for serious
concern.45 He also found that manufacturers collect large
amounts of driving data, often without consumer knowledge.46
40
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In response to Senator Markey’s published findings,
Intel started designing ways to improve vehicular cybersecurity
according to the senator’s goals.47 The Intel White Pages explain
that modern cars, not just self-driving ones, have over 100
electronic control units.48 These units need to be secured against
an attack or the car itself becomes vulnerable, unless the unit was
designed to make vital parts of the vehicle inaccessible. This has
not always been the case and was one of the recommendations for
advancing vehicle cybersecurity. This means there are currently
over 100 parts of a car that can be susceptible to a cyberattack.
These findings indicate that there is a serious problem with
automobile cybersecurity and that car manufacturers are doing
little about it. When left to their own devices, car manufacturers
are not motivated to do enough, which was the problem with the
SELF DRIVE Act. Manufacturers need standards to be accountable
for ensuring consumer safety. Without these standards, the
problems that Senator Markey found in his research will continue.
The Intel White Pages, while a step in the right direction, are
just good ideas and not industry standards. For this reason,
Senator Markey introduced the SPY Car Act of 2015,49 which
he later revised and reintroduced as the SPY Car Act of 2017.50
VI. SPY Car Act

The SPY Car Act of 2017 directs the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to create cybersecurity laws
that automakers must follow. Those laws are to include electronic
controls to manage how and when driving data is collected and
stored. The next portion is to have a cyber dashboard attached to
the vehicle so it can visibly be seen how the vehicle is equipped
47
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to deal with cybersecurity threats and the owner’s privacy.51
One voiced concern with the act regards the cyber
dashboard.52 The issue here is that if everyone can constantly
see what protective measures have been taken, hackers might
find it easier to get around them. The dilemma is that consumers
should know how they are protected, without hackers knowing
what protective measures have been taken against them. The
cyber dashboard only shows how far beyond the standards the
manufacturer went, and will not actually reveal cybersecurity
secrets that protect the vehicle. A consumer has the right to know
what protection they have, and it will still be difficult to hack into
the vehicle despite an idea of the added protections. This makes
the cyber dashboard worth the minimal potential risk it poses.
The act also requires the Federal Trade Commission
to ensure that manufacturers notify consumers about data
collected, provide consumers the option to terminate this data
collection, and prohibit the data from being used for marketing
purposes without permission. These regulations do not include
black box data collection, which is important during crashes.53
The act also sets forth some important cybersecurity
guidelines. First, all entry points in a vehicle must be protected
against hacking. Second, critical and non-critical software
systems need to be isolated. Third, all measures must be updated
based on the NHTSA evaluations. Next, the data collected
must be secured against cyberattacks. Finally, vehicles must
be able to detect, report, and respond to imminent threats.54
51
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The act in its current form proposes several necessary
regulations of self-driving vehicles, but the vague wording of
some sections could cause problems in the future if not changed.
The first area of vague wording that needs to be changed
is “reasonable measures.”55 As it stands, the current wording, “to
be equipped with reasonable measures of protection,” can be
interpreted in many ways and does not ensure a clear standard
for protection. “Reasonable measures” should be replaced
with a standard set of measures. This would ensure that car
companies follow the NHTSA standards for cybersecurity.
These standards should be written into the act and
used to clarify the meaning of “reasonable measures.” This
clarification should be based on the current best standards
brought forth by Intel in their white pages, but should
focus specifically on vehicular cybersecurity. These include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
55

Security techniques – Message Authentication Codes
Trusted Platform Module
Systems and software engineering – Software life cycle
processes
Evaluation criteria for IT security
Functional safety for road vehicles
Information Security Management System
Code of Practice – Security
Code of Practice – Handling PII / SPI (Privacy)
Application security techniques
Privacy architecture framework
Software testing standard
Industrial Network and System Security
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) Minimum
Performance Requirements
Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle
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Systems
Requirements for Hardware-Protected Security for Ground
Vehicle Applications56
This is only part of the list that Intel provides. There should
be further research to see if other standards should be added.
The next vague phrasing in the SPY Car Act says that
measures “shall be evaluated for security vulnerabilities.”57 Part D
of the Act says that all other parts should be updated based on this
evaluation. The problems here lie in the questions of who checks
the evaluation, how often should it be checked, and who is being
evaluated. Manufacturers should be evaluating their vehicles
and standards. The NHTSA should then evaluate this process.
The evaluation by automakers, per part D, should be sent
to the NHTSA. This can be a method for reporting the results of this
kind of testing to hold manufacturers accountable. If it is the first
evaluation and there are problems, then the NHTSA can respond
saying that that vehicle is not fit for the road. If the vehicle passes
all tests the first time, no more evaluations would be needed.
These evaluations should be done with every new vehicle
on the automaker’s side, as well as once a year, ensuring that no
new weaknesses have been discovered. They should also be reevaluated if a potential weakness has been shown or an attack has
taken place. The NHTSA should also yearly review all its standards
ensuring that the “best security practices”58 are the standard.
The final vague section parallels the problem of
“reasonable measures.” It says that vehicles should be
“reasonably secured.”59 Again, this language is vague and
its meaning is up to interpretation. The phrase should be
changed or clarified to reflect that it follows the standards
•
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created under this act. This clarification will ensure the law
is clearly protecting both consumers and manufacturers.
VIII. Implications

One negative aspect of this act is that it requires
manufacturers to do more. While this does provide
safety and privacy, the increased workload, parts,
departments, development, and possibly employees will
likely drive up prices on vehicles. This will increase many
people’s expenses as vehicles become increasingly more
expensive to maintain and eventually need to be replaced.
Another negative aspect of this act is that it will take time
to get the standards set and followed by car companies. This
act will not have final regulations for three years—a long time,
considering that Senator Markey’s research showed problems
back in 2014. This timing means that if the act passes this year,
2018, there will be regulations by 2021. Vehicular cybersecurity
is a national security threat, since cars are ubiquitous. Everyone
is surrounded by vehicles. This means that everyone is at
risk to foreign and domestic attacks. Although it is hard to
speed up this research and standard making, it is important
that the act be passed quickly so manufacturers can adopt
the national cybersecurity standards as quickly as possible.
There are many positive sides of this act. The act
will set standards for safety and ensure consumer privacy.
Cyberwarfare is a reality (there are even jobs in the Air Force
dedicated to cyberwarfare).60 The safety of United States
citizens should not be taken lightly. Cybersecurity of the cars
Americans use every day is indeed a national security issue.
60
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The act will keep people safer and help them decide what
data collected about them is shared with the world. These
protections also profit both consumers and manufacturers.
IX. Conclusion

With self-driving cars quickly advancing, it is important
to adapt federal law to protect this new technology. The lack
of legislation governing drone use has shown the need for
legislation to not fall behind on rapidly developing technologies,
including self-driving cars. Self-driving and smart cars will be
an asset to society: they can help the disabled and the elderly,
and they can be a convenience to many people. However,
without laws to govern cybersecurity, self-driving cars can be a
hazard to all who are on the road. The SPY Car Act can provide
some of that necessary cybersecurity legislation to prevent
hazards. Some safety concerns associated with self-driving
cars cannot be avoided, as with all vehicles, but the act will
increase security measures to eliminate many of those safety
concerns. The SPY Car Act needs to be amended and passed
immediately to ensure the safety of United States citizens.

